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Abstract
Using mineral resources discoveries in the United States since 1800, we
argue that mineral mining fosters individualism. Measuring individualism
and the demand for redistribution by questions of the General Social Sur-
vey (GSS), we show that : (i) individuals living in states with mineral
resources are more individualistic and support less redistribution by the
government ; (ii) the higher the number of mines in a states, the lower the
support for governmental redistribution and the higher the individualism
; (iii) individuals that experienced mineral discoveries during their early
adulthood are more individualistic and support less redistribution ; (iv)
this eect vanishes over time. These results are robust to the introduc-
tion of various explanatory variables that may explain the formation of
individualistic values.
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1 Introduction
In recent years, beliefs and values have gained much attention as a determi-
nant of economic outcomes. The eect of values is actually largely documented
by a growing literature. However, with the notable exception of Nunn and
Wantchekon (2009) or Giuliano and Spilimbergo (2009), the question of their
formation remains broadly unexplored by the empirical literature.
In this paper, we argue that mineral mining fosters individualism, using natu-
ral resources discoveries in United States over the 1800-2000 period. Measuring
individualism and the demand for redistribution by questions of the General
Social Survey (GSS), we show that individuals living in states with mineral
resources are more individualistic and support less redistribution by the govern-
ment.
Since the seminal work by Sachs and Warner (1995), the eects of natu-
ral resources on economic performance have received much attention. A large
literature debates on the signicant negative role played by natural resources
dependence or abundance on economic growth (see Frankel (2010) for a survey
of the resource curse literature). A widely accepted consensus considers natural
resource like a potential curse hindering development. Institutions appear to be
a decisive factor for the resource curse. The eect of natural resource abundance
is conditioned by the institutional level in the country (Mehlum et al. (2006))
or constitutional design. In that later way, Andersen and Alasken (2008) show
that resource curse occurs in democratic presidential countries, but not in demo-
cratic parliamentary country, and that proportional electoral system matters to
reduce the curse.
Empirical studies suer that countries dier in many dimensions (such as
geographic, political and institutional design for example). To avoid these prob-
lem, many papers focus only on one country : the United States for Papyrakis
and Gerlagh (2007), Peru for Aragon and Rud (2009) or Brazil for Casselli
and Michael (2010). The later authors observe that nancial windfall caused
by oil variation output have no signicant eect on municipal non-oil GDP
or its composition. Surprisingly, Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2007) show that some
states in United States, one of the most developed country, suer from resource
curse. They show that natural resources dependence have a negative eect on
growth. Natural resource dependence decreases investment, schooling, openness
and R&D and fosters corruption, aording explanations to this counter-intuitive
result.
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In developing countries, Isham et al. (2005) resume that [...] resource
abundance simultaneously strengthens states and weakens societies, and thus
yields - or at least perpetuates - low levels of development. Many papers point
out the issue of the reaction of economic agents to nancial windfall induced
by natural resources abundance. They mainly focus on incentives played by
nancial windfall in developing countries on the elite's behavior or on the gov-
ernment's behavior (Verdier et al. (2006), Mehlum et al. (2006)). Natural
resources windfall modies incentives for the elite in power and induces changes
in the allocation of their time between productive activities and unproductive
rent seeking (Mehlum et al.(2006), Couttenier (2008)).
A great challenge to understand how resource abundance weakens civil soci-
eties is to explain the behavior and beliefs of the whole society (not only elite)
living in resource abundance area. Diamond (2006) oers a rst insight to this
question with the case study of Montana. He shows the interplay between nat-
ural resources abundance and individual orientations. According to this author,
natural resources abundance is part of the state's identity and partly shapes
individual beliefs about economic organizations.
1
To our best knowledge, Di
Tella et al. (2008) are the rst to provide empirical evidence about this issue.
They study the correlation between individualism and a measure of luck in
United States. They approximate the idea of luck, i.e. the belief that income
is more linked to randomness than to eort, by the share of the oil industry in
the state's economy multiplied by the price of oil. They show that societies
that depend heavily on oil [...] will experience heavier demand for government
intervention.
Our paper provides micro-economic evidence that mining discoveries inu-
ence the behavior and values of people living in natural resource abundance
area. However, explaining the eect of individualism on growth is beyond the
scope of this paper (see Grorodnichenko and Roland (2010) for an investigation
of this question). In other terms, we are agnostic concerning the sign of the
eect of individualism on economic performance. The Mineral Resources Data
System lists all mineral discoveries since 1800 in the United States. It allows to
observe the eect of both the spatial and temporal dierences in the distribution
of mineral discoveries across states on some agent-level beliefs. We focus on the
extend of individualism and on the demand for redistribution by individuals.
Theses variables are measured using three question of the GSS which allow to
1
See the appendix for a short presentation of the text by Diamond (2006) on Montana.
3
capture various aspect of these issues.
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We show that : (i) individuals living in states with mineral resources are
more individualistic and support less redistribution ; (ii) the higher the number
of mines in a states, the lower the support for governmental redistribution and
the higher the individualism. These results are robust to the introduction of
various explanatory variables that may explain these values. Considering the
formation and the transmission of these values, we show that : (iii) individuals
that experienced mineral discoveries during their impressionable years
3
are
more individualistic and support less redistribution ; (iv) the eect of mineral
resources on individualism is slowly decreasing over time.
These results can be at least partly explained by the well-known eect of
income on the demand for redistribution. In fact, natural resources represent
a nancial windfall which is likely to induce both an increase of current and
expected income. As a consequence, a society with natural resources may feel
richer than a society without any natural resources endowment. Increasing
income or expected income is known to be associated with less willingness to
redistribute as shown by a large literature building on Romer (1975), Meltzer
and Richards (1981) and Piketty (1995). This relationship has been documented
by Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) and Alesina and Giuliano (2009) among others.
Alesina and Angeletos (2005) focused in particular on the role of the opinion of
respondents on whether income is mostly determined by eort or luck.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data and the
methodology. Section 3 presents empirical results about the relationship be-
tween mineral resources and individualism. In section 4, we investigate the role
played by mineral discoveries in the formation and the transmission of individ-
ualistic values. Finally, section 5 briey concludes.
2 Data and methodology
This section describes the data and the methodology used in this paper.
2
See section 3 for a detailed presentation of theses variables
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Following Giuliano and Spilimbergo (2009), the term impressionable years refers to the
hypothesis that core attitudes, beliefs, and values crystallize during a period of great mental
plasticity in early adulthood and remain largely unaltered throughout the remaining adult
years.
4
2.1 Mineral Resources Data System
The Mineral Resources Data System
4
(MRDS) describes mineral resources through-
out the world. The dataset for the United States contains more than 25 000
observations. About 50% of them have lead to the installation of a mine. For
each observation, the dataset contains information about the localization, the
year of discovery, the year of rst production (if any production has been op-
erated), and the type of commodities, but also various geologic characteristics.
Information of major importance that are missing are those about quantities
found and extracted. To our knowledge, this paper is the rst to use this
database in economic research.
The gure 1 presents the distribution of mineral resources discoveries in the
United States over the 1800-2000 period. Most of the discoveries have been
made between 1875 and the late 50's. However, the distribution is quite het-
erogeneous across time. Figure 2 displays the spatial distribution of mineral
resources mines in the United States according to the MRDS database. This
spatial distribution is also very heterogeneous. Clearly, West states have greater
endowments in mineral resources than others. Table 8, presented in appendix,
shows the number of mines in each States. We distinguish between all observa-
tions and places where a production was (or is still) operated. Both distributions
are very similar. Since we want to make the distinction between states with and
without mineral resources, we have to establish a criterion to split our sample
in two parts. The simplest criterion is the median of the sample. This is where
we place the threshold between states with and without mineral resources. In
all the tables of the paper, the variable mineral state equals 1 if the respondent
lives in a state with mineral resources, 0 otherwise.
Using MRDS observations to track the extent of mineral resources available
in each state oers the advantage of being almost completely exogenous. Pa-
pyrakis and Gerlagh (2007) and Di Tella et al. (2008), among others, measure
natural resources using the share of local GDP of a specic sector and the price
of commodities. This measure is clearly endogenous to economic activity and
development, and consequently to social attitudes provided that the later have
an eect on the former (see Brunnschweiler (2008) for example). On the con-
trary, the tenor of the ground itself cannot be inuenced by economic activity,
nor by values. To a certain extent, one can argue that the discovery of mineral
resources is however endogenous to economic development, what is likely to be
4
http://tin.er.usgs.gov/mrds/
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Figure 1: Distribution of mineral resources discoveries in the United Sates (1800-
2000)
Figure 2: Distribution of mines in the United States (1800-2000)
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true. However, it is also possible that once economic development is launched,
mineral resources are searched everywhere. On the one hand, the precise date of
discovery of mineral resources can be seen as endogenous to economic activity.
On the other hand, if we consider that all mineral resources have been searched
for (as suggested by 1 which shows that discoveries are scare since 1960) , the
categorization of states with and without mineral resources cannot be endoge-
nous to values at the time of interview (the sample of the GSS we use begins in
1974).
Table 9, presented in appendix, describes the main types of mineral com-
modities found in the MRDS database. Gold, silver and other valuable ores
represent a substantial part of the mining activity in the United States.
2.2 Data on Individualism
In this paper, we measure individualism at the individual level in the United
States by using three questions of the General Social Survey.
The rst question used also by Di Tella et al. (2008) is Some people think
that the government in Washington should do everything possible to improve
the standard of living of all poor Americans. Other people think it is not the
government's responsibility, and that each person should take care of himself.
Where would you place yourself on this scale ?. The possible answers are 1
(I strongly agree that the government should increase living standards), 2, 3 (I
agree with both answers), 4, 5 (I strongly agree that people should take care of
themselves). We call this variable responsibility.
The second question is Some people think that the government in Wash-
ington ought to reduce the income dierences between the rich and the poor,
perhaps by raising the taxes of wealthy families or by giving income assistance
to the poor. Others think that the government should not concern itself with
reducing this income dierence between the rich and the poor. What score be-
tween 1 and 7 comes closest to the way you feel ?. The possible answers are
1 (Government should do something to reduce income dierences), 2, 3, 4, 5,
6, 7 (Government should not concern itself with income dierences). It what
follows, we refer to this variable as inequalities.
The last question is We are faced with many problems in this country, none
of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. I'm going to name some of these
problems, and for each one I'd like you to tell me whether you think we're
spending too much money on it, too little money, or about the right amount.
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Figure 3: Responsibility by state, GSS 1975-2004.
Mean by state of the answer to the question : Some people think that the government in Washington
should do everything possible to improve the standard of living of all poor Americans. Other people
think it is not the government's responsibility, and that each person should take care of himself.
Where would you place yourself on this scale ?. The possible answers are 1 (I strongly agree that
the government should increase living standards), 2, 3 (I agree with both answers), 4, 5 (I strongly
agree that people should take care of themselves). Data are missing for Nebraska and Nevada.
Are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on assistance
to the poor ?. The possible answers are 1 (Too little), 2 (About right), 3 (Too
much). We call this variable assistance.
These beliefs oer a converging picture toward individualism and the de-
mand for redistribution. According to Di Tella et al. (2008), the set of values
associated with these variables can also be seen as associated with political ideas
that are on the right of the political system.
All regressions includes individual characteristics as control variables. Namely,
we control for gender, age, marital status, religion, education, employment sta-
tus, race and income.
5
Once the availability of control variables is taken into account, we are left
with more than 20 000 observations for responsibility and inequalities. For the
variable assistance, we have a little more than 14 000 observations.
6
Figure 3 presents the mean of the responsibility variable by state over the
period 1975-2004. At the rst sight, this variable is higher in the West part
of the Unites States, which means that a greater proportion of the population
living in those states thinks that each person should take care of himself.
5
See the appendix for a complete presentation of individual control variables.
6
Notice that data on responsibility, inequalities and assistance are not available for Ne-
braska and Nevada.
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2.3 Methodology
We estimate the following equation :
yits = ®Ms + ¯Xits + "its;
where the dependent variable yits is the answer of individual i, interviewed
at time t and living in state s, to the questions associated with responsibility,
inequalities or assistance. The variableMs indicates the mineral status of state
s. The vector Xits always contains individual characteristics, but also time or
geographic xed eects or state-level variables in some specications. Since
our classication of individuals between those living in states with or without
mineral resources is logically made at the state level, all our estimations are
made using clustered standard errors at the state level. The limited number of
clusters could have made statistical inference dicult as pointed out by Cameron
et al. (2008).
Rigorously, since our dependent variables are qualitative variables, ordered
logit models should be used. However, all reported results are estimated using
linear ordinary least squares such that we can interpret the size of the coe-
cients. All coecients have the same sign and the same signicance level when
using ordered logit models.
7
When distinguishing between individuals that observed mineral resources
discoveries and those who did not, we use the impressionable years presented
by Giuliano and Spilimbergo (2009). This hypothesis states that core attitudes,
beliefs, and values crystallize during a period of great mental plasticity in early
adulthood and remain largely unaltered throughout the remaining adult years.
We follow Giuliano and Spilimbergo (2009) by assuming that impressionable
years take place between 18 and 25 years. Hence, we are interested in whether
an individual observed mineral discoveries when he was between 18 and 25 years
old. For example, if an individual aged 50 is interviewed in 1980, its impressive
years are between 1948 and 1955.
The General Social Survey does not allow us to know in which state respon-
dent was living when she was young. However, we know if the respondent is
still living in the same state as when she was 16 years old. Thus, we have to
restrict ourselves to individuals that did not move between the two dates. This
left us with around 5000 individuals who were and are still living in mineral
7
Results are not shown here but available upon request.
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Table 1: Tests of the equality of means
Observations Mean Std. Err.
Responsibility
Mineral states 9918 2.92 .012
Non mineral states 10364 2.87 .011
Dierence .04*** .016
Inequalities
Mineral states 10251 3.82 .019
Non mineral states 10901 3.66 .018
Dierence .16*** .027
Assistance
Mineral states 6935 1.48 .008
Non mineral states 7083 1.45 .008
Dierence .03*** .011
*** dierence signicant at the 1% condence level
states. Thanks to the MRDS database, we know if they observed any mineral
resources discoveries during their early adulthood.
3 Empirical results
This section presents the empirical results and their discussion. We also provide
a large number of robustness checks regarding alternative explanations of the
relationship between natural resources and individualism.
3.1 Main Results and discussion
We rst start by a simple test of equality of the means of our individualism
measures across states with and without mineral resources. Table 1 presents
the standard t-tests for variables responsibility, inequalities and assistance. In
all cases, the average answer is higher in states with mineral resources than in
states without mineral endowments. All dierences are signicant at the 1%
level.
Main results
We now regress our measures of individualism on the state's mineral status vari-
able, controlling by individual characteristics to check if the earlier results are
not driven by composition eects. Our baseline specication includes usual con-
trol variables for gender, age, age squared, marital status, religion, education,
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employment status, race and income, as well as xed eects for the year of inter-
view. Time xed eects control for potential common temporal determinants of
beliefs. Estimated coecients for dependent variables responsibility, inequalities
and assistance are presented in table 2. The estimated coecients of all indi-
vidual variables are consistent with other results in the literature (see Alesina
and La Ferrara (2005) among others). The eect of age on individualism is very
weak relatively to the eect of other variables. Males are more individualistic
than females. Being married or employed increase the answers to the three
questions. Income also decrease the demand for redistribution (Romer (1975),
Meltzer and Richards (1981) and Piketty (1995)). So does the educational level.
White are more individualistic than others. Being protestant or catholic also
increases individualism and decreases the demand of redistribution.
In all columns of table 2, the estimated coecient of the dummy variable
for individual living in states with mineral resources is positive and signicant.
The estimated coecient is about 0:05 when responsibility is the dependent
variable. As a comparison, the eect of being catholic equals 0:07, the reference
being none/other; whereas the estimated eect of being married equals 0:18.
Hence, the eect of living in a mineral state on responsibility is of the same
order of magnitude as the one of religion or marital status. Moreover, this eect
represents up to one third of the eect of being married, one of the variables with
the largest eect on responsibility. Using inequalities as dependent variable, the
estimated eect of the mineral status of the state represents up to half of the
eect of being married or protestant. In the case of assistance, the estimated
eect is even stronger. These estimations allow us to conclude that dierences
in individualism between states with or without mineral resources are not driven
by a composition eect of the populations surveyed, i.e. individuals living in
mineral states do not systematically share observable characteristics that favor
individualism. In other terms, the eect of residence in a mineral state still
holds when controlling for a large set of individual characteristics.
Discussion
At a rst sight, these results are opposite to those of Di Tella et al.(2008). These
authors show that there is a negative relationship between individualism and
oil in the United States. How can we conciliate this two sets of results ?
First of all, Di Tella et al. (2008) argues that the importance of oil indus-
try is a proxy for luck at the state level. This, in turn, inuences the demand
11
Table 2: Eect of residence in a mineral state on individualism
(1) (2) (3)
Responsibility Inequalities Assistance
Mineral state 0.0509* 0.148*** 0.0385**
(0.0282) (0.0524) (0.0189)
Male 0.147*** 0.298*** 0.0421***
(0.0158) (0.0233) (0.0107)
Age -0.00921*** 0.00194 -0.00530***
(0.00286) (0.00434) (0.00144)
Age squared 0.000148*** 3.91e-05 8.92e-05***
(3.11e-05) (4.35e-05) (1.46e-05)
Married 0.185*** 0.266*** 0.0718***
(0.0216) (0.0336) (0.0107)
Protestant 0.196*** 0.290*** 0.0605**
(0.0195) (0.0397) (0.0227)
Catholic 0.0721*** 0.140*** -0.00391
(0.0233) (0.0464) (0.0256)
Education 0.0416*** 0.106*** 0.0144***
(0.00322) (0.00532) (0.00255)
Employed 0.119*** 0.0890*** 0.0561***
(0.0193) (0.0310) (0.0119)
White 0.547*** 0.738*** 0.254***
(0.0240) (0.0465) (0.0144)
Income 0.0217*** 0.0200*** 0.00595**
(0.00329) (0.00398) (0.00223)
Constant 1.446*** 0.803*** 0.935***
(0.0972) (0.137) (0.0705)
Time xed eects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 20282 21152 14018
R-squared 0.087 0.082 0.059
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Robust standard errors in parentheses
Standard errors clustered at the state level
OLS regressions
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for redistribution of individuals. Indeed, the greater the feeling that luck in-
stead of hard work determines income, the larger the demand for redistribution.
Symmetrically, if an individual thinks that income is primarily determined by
individual eort, he will exhibit less willingness to redistribute. In fact, the
feeling that success is determined by luck is less widespread in our states with
mineral resources as shown by table 10 presented in appendix. In table 10, the
dependent variable is the answer to the following question : Some people say
that people get ahead by their own hard work; others say that lucky breaks
or help from other people are more important. Which do you think is most
important? The possible answers are 1 (Hard work most important), 2 (Hard
work, luck equally important), 3 (Luck most important). We created a dummy
variable equal to 1 if the respondent thinks that luck is most important, and
equals 0 otherwise. The estimated coecient of the dummy variable for mineral
state is negative and signicant. Which means that individual living in mineral
states are less likely to think that luck is most important. This diers from the
assumption of Di Tella et al. (2008) on the positive eect of oil on luck.
Second, there is also another way to conciliate these two results on the
link between resources and individualism. This divergence can be driven by
the dierences in the characteristics of oil and mineral resources. We focus on
mineral resources, as described in table 9, whereas Di Tella et al. (2008) focus
on oil industry. This dierence remains to be explored. This can be done by
looking at the work by Boschini et al. (2007). These authors argue that the
eect of natural resources on economic performance depends on the types of
resources possessed. In this framework, they point out the role of resource's
appropriability. According to them, the concept of appropriability captures the
likelihood that natural resources lead to rent-seeking, corruption or conicts
which, in turn, harm economic development [Boschini et al. (2007)]. They
distinguish between institutional and technical appropriability. The rst type
of appropriability is related to the institutional capacity to manage natural
resources exploitation. Given that we focus only on the United States, we
believe that institutional appropriability is fairly homogeneous in our study and
thus cannot explain the puzzle presented above. On the other hand, due to
their physical and economical characteristics, certain resources are more likely
to cause appropriative behavior. This is what Boschini et al. (2007) dene as
technical appropriability. This can allow to make a crucial distinction between
mineral resources and oil. Indeed, mineral resources in general, and gold and
silver in particular (what represent more than 50% of our observations that
13
Table 3: Eect of the number of mines on individualism
Responsibility Inequalilties Assistance
(1) (2) (3)
Number of mines 0.0185 0.0787** 0.0176*
(0.0157) (0.0383) (0.00910)
Observations 20282 21152 14018
R-squared 0.086 0.081 0.058
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors clustered at the state level
OLS regressions
All regressions include control variables for gender, age,
age squared, marital status, religion, education,
employment status, race, income, time of interview
and a constant term.
have led to production) are more appropriable than oil. Mineral resources are
intrinsically more valuable, transportable and storable. Such resources are thus
more likely to raise individualistic incentives and behaviors. In our opinion, this
approach oers a valuable way to account for the opposite eects of natural
resources on individualism found in Di Tella et al. (2008) and our paper.
Intensity eect
In table 3 we focus on states in which any mining as taken place in the 20th
century. We then replace the mineral status variable by a broad measure of the
abundance of mineral resources, i.e. by the number of mines in the state as
described by table 8. We found that the number of mines has a positive eect
on our three measures of individualism at the individual level. This suggest that
even within mineral states, the more mineral resources in the state, the more
individualistic the state's residents.
3.2 Robustness checks
Omitted variables
The positive eect of mineral endowment on individualism could be determined
by omitted variables. In table 4, we add following control variables to our
specications : political orientation, region xed eects, GDP per capita, the
coecient of Gini and mineral mining dependency.
Geographical bias: As shown by gure 2, the spatial distribution of min-
ing activity in the United States is broadly polarized between West and East.
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Hence, our correlation could be driven by a simple omitted variable due to com-
mon characteristics shared by geographically close states. This is why we use
the regional divisions of the United States Census Bureau as control variables
columns 1, 7, and 13 of table 4. This division imply the use of four region xed
eects for Northeast, Midwest, South and West. The estimated coecient of
the mineral status remains signicant in the case of inequalities and assistance.
The estimated coecient when responsibility is the dependent variables is no
more signicant, but not far from the 10% level (the p-value equals 0:14).
Political orientation: As mentioned above, the values we consider as reect-
ing greater individualism can also be simply associated to right-wing orienta-
tions. In order to show that we are not capturing only right-wing ideas, we
control for political orientations using the Ranney index in columns 2, 8 and
14.
8
We use a version of the Ranney index that captures the extent to which ei-
ther the Democratic or Republican Party dominates the upper and lower houses
of the state legislatures (see Berkowitz and Clay (2010) for more explanation
on Ranney index building). This variable increases when the Democratic party
dominates the state at the time of interview. As shown by table 4, the esti-
mated coecient of our variable of interest is unaected by the introduction
of this variable for two out of our three dependent variables. Furthermore, the
estimated coecient of the Ranney index is negative. This means that people
living in states dominated by the Democratic Party have less individualistic
values.
GDP Eect : In columns 3, 9 and 15 we include the log of GDP per capita at
the time of interview to control for dierences in aggregate wealth and develop-
ment. Adding GDP per capita in the regressions does not harm the signicance,
nor the magnitude of the mineral status variable.
Inequalities Eect : Then, in columns 4, 10 and 16 we control for a potential
inequalities eect on our interest variable. In that sense, we control with a Gini
coecient at the time of interview as a control variable. We nd no signicant
relationship between this variable and individualism. Once again, this does not
harm the estimated coecient of our variable of interest.
The Share of Mining Activity : In columns 5, 11 and 17, we introduce the
mineral mining dependency
9
of the state of residence at the time of interview
as a control variable. Once again the estimated coecient of our variable of
8
The version of the Ranney index we use is not available after 2000. This explains why
there are less observations in specications including the Ranney index.
9
Mineral mining dependency is measured by the share of mining activity in the state GDP.
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interest is unchanged.
When using all control variables simultaneously (columns 6, 12 and 18), the
variable mineral state is positive and signicant for all our measures of individ-
ualism. These estimations allow us to conclude that the eect of the mineral
status is not driven by omitted variable such as regions xed eects, political
orientations, GDP per capita, Gini coecient or geographical characteristics.
Selection Eect
A concern about the relationship documented here is that it could be driven
by a selection eect, i.e. more individualistic individuals could have been at-
tracted by the spirit or by the opportunities oered by mineral states. This
interpretation is tackled in table 5. We create a dummy variable equals to one
if respondent as changed state since she was 16 years old. This allow to check
if movers are more individualistic than non-movers. Furthermore, interacting
this variable with the mineral status variable, we are able to check if movers to
mineral states demand less redistribution than others. We include time xed
eects in even numbered columns. When the dependent variable is responsibil-
ity or assistance we do not nd any support for the hypothesis that movers are
more individualistic than non-movers, nor for the idea that mineral states could
attract mainly individualistic individuals. In the case of the variable inequalities
the estimated coecient on the mover variable is signicant and positive. This
suggest that movers tend to be more adverse to the reduction of income inequal-
ities than non-movers. However the estimated coecient of the interaction term
is negative, ruling out the former interpretation. Hence, we can conclude that
the relationship between the mineral status of the state and the demand for
redistribution and individualism is not driven by selection of migration eects.
Spurious correlation
In table 11, presented in appendix, we rule out the possibility that we are
documenting a broad distrust to the government and not a specic eect of
mineral status on individualism or that our relationship is purely spurious. We
measure the general trust in the government and in television using questions
of the General Social Survey. The common question reads as I am going to
name some institutions in this country. As far as the people running these
institutions are concerned, would you say you have a great deal of condence,
only some condence, or hardly any condence at all in them? . We use answers
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Table 4: Eect of residence in a mineral state on individualism, controlling
for political orientation, region xed eects, GDP per capita, inequalities and
mineral dependency
Responsibility
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mineral state 0.0513 0.0439 0.0636*** 0.0606** 0.0486* 0.0550*
(0.0344) (0.0270) (0.0218) (0.0290) (0.0284) (0.0308)
Ranney index -0.00116 -0.000201
(0.000780) (0.000700)
GDP per capita (log) -0.312*** -0.244**
(0.108) (0.111)
Gini coecient -0.511 -1.024
(0.706) (0.637)
Mineral mining dependency -0.0110 -0.0204
(0.0134) (0.0133)
Region xed eects Yes Yes
Observations 20282 18529 20282 20282 20282 18529
R-squared 0.088 0.091 0.088 0.087 0.087 0.093
Inequalities
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Mineral state 0.101* 0.147*** 0.161*** 0.139** 0.148*** 0.119**
(0.0509) (0.0410) (0.0501) (0.0522) (0.0521) (0.0458)
Ranney index -0.00451*** -0.00357***
(0.000911) (0.000862)
GDP per capita (log) -0.323 0.110
(0.210) (0.168)
Gini coecient 0.501 -0.0551
(1.293) (0.896)
Mineral mining dependency -0.00219 -0.0135*
(0.00827) (0.00727)
Region xed eects Yes Yes
Observations 21152 19381 21152 21152 21152 19381
R-squared 0.084 0.086 0.082 0.082 0.082 0.086
Assistance
(13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
Mineral state 0.0656*** 0.0446** 0.0463*** 0.0394* 0.0388** 0.0679***
(0.0217) (0.0195) (0.0171) (0.0196) (0.0188) (0.0215)
Ranney index -0.000136 0.000287
(0.000623) (0.000499)
GDP per capita (log) -0.211** -0.0889
(0.0813) (0.0682)
Gini coecient -0.0441 0.392
(0.455) (0.405)
Mineral mining dependency 0.00418 0.00120
(0.00570) (0.00621)
Region xed eects Yes Yes
Observations 14018 11367 14018 14018 14018 11367
R-squared 0.062 0.060 0.060 0.059 0.059 0.063
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Robust standard errors in parentheses
Standard errors clustered at the state level
OLS regressions
All regressions include control variables for gender, age, age squared, marital status, religion, education,
employment status, race, income, time of interview and a constant term.
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Table 5: Eect of residence in a mineral state on individualism, movers incidence
Responsibility Inequalities Assistance
(1) (2) (3)
Mineral state (A) 0.0551* 0.191*** 0.0393*
(0.0323) (0.0634) (0.0213)
Mover (B) 0.00915 0.115* -0.000628
(0.0288) (0.0603) (0.0193)
A x B -0.0178 -0.144* -0.00140
(0.0402) (0.0809) (0.0235)
Observations 20106 21025 13953
R-squared 0.087 0.082 0.059
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors clustered at the state level
OLS regressions
All regressions include control variables for gender, age,
age squared, marital status, religion, education,
employment status, race, income, time of interview
and a constant term.
for the following institutions : Executive branch of the federal government,
Congress and TV . Results of the corresponding regressions are presented in
table 11. We nd no signicant relationship between our mineral status variable
and condence in the government or in television. This suggests that we are
indeed documenting a relationship from mineral resources to individualism and
not a broad distrust in public institutions or our relationship is purely spurious.
4 Formation and Transmission of Individualistic
Values
The above results show the importance of mineral resources for individualistic
orientations. As Bisin and Verdier (2001), the literature around the formation
and the transmission of beliefs points out two main channels through which
values are formed. The rst channel is the transmission of values from one
generation to the next. The second one is the experiences made by an individual
during is life.
Given the data we have, we are not able to develop an empirical strategy that
would allow to identify perfectly these two channels. However, in this section,
we present two strategies that aord information about the mechanisms of the
formation and the transmission of individualistic values in states with mineral
resources.
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4.1 Eect of Mineral Resources Discoveries during Im-
pressive Years Period
Focusing on states with mineral resources, we now distinguish between individ-
uals who observed mineral resources discoveries in the state when they where
young and those who did not. This strategy imposes us to focus only on in-
dividuals who did not change state between early adulthood and the time of
interview. Indeed, we recall that we are not able to know where individuals
were living when they were young. Instead, we know if they stayed in the same
state.
We create a dummy variable equals to one if respondent is likely to have ob-
served mineral resources discoveries between 18 and 25 years. Figure 4 presents
the share of each cohort who observed mineral discoveries.
10
Table 6 presents
the results of these regressions. The estimated coecient of the dummy vari-
able is always positive. Moreover, it is signicant at the 5% level for two out
of three dependent variables. The magnitude of these coecients suggests that
the eect of having observed mineral resources discoveries is stronger than the
simple eect of the mineral status previously estimated. This means that hav-
ing observed mineral discoveries fosters individualism and harms the individual
demand of redistribution. This result still holds when adding dierent control
variables such as the Gini coecient, GDP per capita, mineral mining depen-
dency, political orientations during impressionable years or cohort xed eects
(results not reported here and available upon request).
By underlying the role of mineral discoveries during early adulthood, these
results show that each mineral discovery increases individualistic values in the
population. This support the idea that experiences of mineral discoveries play
a role in the formation of individualistic values.
4.2 The Long Term Eect of Mineral Resources on Indi-
vidualism
Considering that shocks represented by mineral discoveries foster individualism,
we would like to know if this eect is persistent over time. In other terms, we
would like to know how individualistic values are transmitted over time.
10
In gure 4, the share of cohort who observed mineral discoveries during impressionable
years equals one for cohorts born in 1885 and 1886 because we have only two respondents
born respectively in 1885 and 1886. Those two individuals observed mineral discoveries. For
cohorts born in 1880-1884 and in 1887-1888, we have not any observation.
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Table 6: Eect of the mineral resources discoveries during impressionable years
on individualism
(1) (2) (3)
Responsibility Inequalities Assistance
Mineral discoveries observed 0.0934** 0.173** 0.0416
(0.0382) (0.0824) (0.0266)
Male 0.170*** 0.287*** 0.0289
(0.0273) (0.0303) (0.0228)
Age -0.0112** -6.81e-05 -0.00431
(0.00512) (0.00943) (0.00282)
Age squared 0.000140** 1.61e-05 7.52e-05**
(5.48e-05) (8.83e-05) (3.14e-05)
Married 0.204*** 0.252*** 0.0999***
(0.0301) (0.0571) (0.0219)
Protestant 0.227*** 0.309*** 0.0616
(0.0334) (0.0730) (0.0479)
Catholic 0.0537 0.0833 0.0128
(0.0398) (0.0801) (0.0415)
Education 0.0493*** 0.0963*** 0.0172***
(0.00755) (0.00975) (0.00395)
Employed 0.119*** 0.131** 0.0687***
(0.0275) (0.0552) (0.0232)
White 0.496*** 0.760*** 0.234***
(0.0440) (0.0699) (0.0317)
Income 0.0239*** 0.0164** 0.0119***
(0.00590) (0.00634) (0.00284)
Constant 1.374*** 1.047*** 0.850***
(0.132) (0.222) (0.107)
Time xed eects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5815 6032 4114
R-squared 0.097 0.082 0.069
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Robust standard errors in parentheses
Standard errors clustered at the state level
OLS regressions
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Figure 4: Share of cohort who observed mineral discoveries during impression-
able years
Consequently, we dene the peak of mineral discoveries for each state by
taking the ve years period with the most discoveries. According to all the
former results, this peak is a key date in the evolution of individualism in the
state. Then, we construct the distance to discoveries, which is the dierence
between the year of interview and the peak.
For the same reasons as above, we use only non-movers living in states with
mineral resources. The eect of the distance to discoveries on individualism is
presented in table 7. The estimated coecient of this variable is negative in the
three specications, and signicant in two out of three cases. This means that
the longer ago the peak occurred, the less individualistic the individuals living
in states with mineral resources. In other terms, the positive eect of mineral
resources on individualism slowly mitigates over time. For example, an increase
by 50 years in the distance to discoveries is associated with a 0:1 decrease in
inequalities. As a comparison, this is equivalent to the eect of a 1 year decrease
in formal education.
These results support the idea that mineral discoveries have a long lasting
eect on individualism.
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Table 7: Eect of the distance to discoveries on individualism
(1) (2) (3)
Responsibility Inequalities Assistance
Distance to discoveries -0.00972* -0.0212* -0.00438
(0.00531) (0.0115) (0.00339)
Male 0.176*** 0.290*** 0.0310
(0.0279) (0.0304) (0.0229)
Age -0.00814 0.00422 -0.00282
(0.00511) (0.00873) (0.00311)
Age squared 0.000117** -1.01e-05 6.53e-05*
(5.53e-05) (8.28e-05) (3.34e-05)
Married 0.208*** 0.251*** 0.100***
(0.0300) (0.0568) (0.0218)
Protestant 0.226*** 0.309*** 0.0577
(0.0326) (0.0682) (0.0484)
Catholic 0.0416 0.0620 0.0152
(0.0394) (0.0770) (0.0415)
Education 0.0501*** 0.0965*** 0.0173***
(0.00730) (0.00903) (0.00402)
Employed 0.122*** 0.140** 0.0693***
(0.0278) (0.0573) (0.0228)
White 0.504*** 0.773*** 0.235***
(0.0438) (0.0713) (0.0325)
Income 0.0236*** 0.0155** 0.0120***
(0.00602) (0.00649) (0.00283)
Constant 1.403*** 1.117*** 0.771***
(0.142) (0.389) (0.114)
Time xed eects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5741 5957 4084
R-squared 0.098 0.082 0.069
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Robust standard errors in parentheses
Standard errors clustered at the state level
OLS regressions
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5 Conclusion
In this paper, we show that living in a state with mineral resources leads indi-
viduals to be more individualistic and to demand less redistribution. This result
is robust to various alternative explanations and is reinforced by the quantity
of mineral resources in state. Furthermore, we shown that this eect is likely
to be driven by a direct impact of resources discoveries on individuals beliefs,
i.e., that, in states with mineral resources, individuals who are likely to have
observed resources discoveries during their early adulthood are also more indi-
vidualistic and demand less redistribution than others. Finally, we have shown
that the positive eect of mineral resources on individualism slowly mitigates
over time.
In the introduction, we stressed that we are agnostic regarding the eect of
individualism on growth. However, if we assume that individualism is detrimen-
tal for economic development, then our results aord an additional channel to
explain the resource curse.
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A Additional tables
Table 8: Distribution of mineral resources by state
Observations Production Observations Production
Delaware 0 0 South Carolina 1 1
Hawaii 1 0 Vermont 1 1
Illinois 9 0 Virginia 1 1
Indiana 0 0 New Hampshire 10 3
Iowa 0 0 New York 12 4
Kansas 0 0 Florida 28 5
Kentucky 0 0 Georgia 82 5
Maryland 4 0 Arkansas 14 6
Massachusetts 1 0 Oklahoma 144 47
Michigan 0 0 Wyoming 370 54
Minnesota 2 0 Idaho 237 67
Mississippi 0 0 North Carolina 134 77
Nebraska 0 0 New Jersey 238 224
North Dakota 0 0 South Dakota 395 272
Ohio 0 0 Washington 1598 298
Pennsylvania 8 0 Texas 629 427
Tennessee 5 0 Colorado 1411 546
West Virginia 3 0 New Mexico 947 588
Wisconsin 1 0 Montana 1382 663
Alabama 1 1 Alaska 2432 727
Connecticut 3 1 Arizona 2475 1358
Louisiana 1 1 Utah 2327 1377
Maine 15 1 Nevada 2648 1385
Missouri 1 1 California 4138 1493
Rhode Island 3 1 Oregon 4850 3840
Total 26562 13475
Mean 531 270
Median 8 1
Observations : simple entries in the MRDS database
Production : places where mining has been operated
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Table 9: Major commodities present, by type of observation
Occurrence % Prospect % Production % Total %
Copper 14,6 30,9 9,5 12,6
Gold 31,3 48,2 30,8 31,6
Iron 2,5 1,3 1,8 2,1
Lead 8,1 18,5 10,0 9,4
Silver 13,8 28,8 18,2 16,6
Tungsten 3,7 3,1 3,0 3,3
Uranium 8,6 3,4 5,2 6,7
Zinc 4,2 12,7 3,4 4,1
Other* 38,7 19,4 44,7 41,0
The summ of percentages is not equal to 100 because the same
resource may contain several commodities.
* Other means none of the above commodities.
Occurrence : No production has taken place and there has been no
or little activity since discovery.
Prospect : Work such as surface trenching, adits, or shafts, drill
holes, extensive geophysics, geochemistry, and/or geologic
mapping has been carried out.
Production : Mining has been operated.
Table 10: Relationship between luck at the individual level and mineral endow-
ment at the state level
Dependent variable equals 1 if luck is most important to get ahead and 0 otherwise
Mineral state -0.106* Education -0.0219**
(0.0617) (0.00889)
Male 0.350*** Employed -0.00865
(0.0431) (0.0709)
Age 0.0277*** White -0.246***
(0.00974) (0.0629)
Age squared -0.000240** Income -0.00504
(9.61e-05) (0.00835)
Married -0.255*** Constant -2.301***
(0.0500) (0.350)
Protestant -0.281*** Time xed eects Yes
(0.0866)
Catholic -0.105 Observations 14933
(0.0826) Pseudo R-squared 0.0184
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Robust standard errors in parentheses
Standard errors clustered at the state level
Logit model
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Table 11: Eect of residence in a mineral state on condence in the government
and in television
Executive Branch
Condence in of Federal The Congress Television
Government
(1) (2) (3)
Mineral state -0.00972 -0.00726 0.00546
(0.0143) (0.0144) (0.0129)
Observations 21764 21786 22054
R-squared 0.030 0.043 0.047
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors clustered at the state level
OLS regressions
All regressions include control variables for gender, age,
age squared, marital status, religion, education,
employment status, race, income, time of interview
and a constant term.
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B General Social Survey control variables
All our results are robust to alternative denitions of the variables.
Sex Respondent's gender. Equals 1 for males and 0 for females.
Age Respondent's age in years.
Age squared Square of respondent's age.
Protestant and
Catholic
Respondent's religious aliation. The omitted category is
other or none.
Education Completed years of formal education.
Employed Respondent's employment status. Equals 1 for full time,
part time or self employed. The omitted category is
retired, housewife, student, unemployed or other.
White Respondent's race. Equals 1 for white. The omitted category
is black or other.
Income Respondent's family income, corrected for family size. Our
measure of income is slightly dierent from the one use in other
analysis using the GSS. Usually, the GSS variable INCOME is
used as a measure of income dierences. This variable gives
information about the respondent's total family income and is
coded using 12 income brackets for the entire period covered
by the survey. Using this variable without any transformation
has two drawbacks. First, this does not take into account the
size of the family. Second, the fact that the same coding is
used for the whole period makes it an inappropriate measure
because both of ination and the increasing standard of living.
Hence, we rst create broad family income deciles using the
income variables dener for shorter time periods (INCOME72,
INCOME77, etc.). Then, we divide this new variable by the
household's size using the HOMPOP variable.
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C Other variables
Variable Source
GDP per capita in 1999 dollars US Census Bureau
Gini coecient US Census Bureau
Mineral mining dependency Bureau of Economic Analysis
Ranney index Berkowitz and Clay (2010)
D Natural resources and beliefs in Montana
As indicated by its title Collapse : How societies choose to fail or to survive,
the book of Jared Diamond presents a large number of cases where societies
face challenges at some point in their history. Some of them succeed, whereas
others fail in doing so.
The rst chapter of the book - Under Montana's big sky - is devoted to
the American state of Montana. This state faces major challenges regarding
the evolution of its economy and various natural disasters are threatening its
survival. Indeed, the economy of Montana heavily relies on natural resources
exploitation. According to Diamond, this economic organization has strong
ties with inhabitants attitudes and political orientations. As a consequence,
individual attitudes becomes in turn a barrier to solve new problems :
Despite Montanans' longstanding embrace of mining as a tradi-
tional value dening their state's identity, they have recently become
increasingly disillusioned with mining and have contributed to the
industry's near-demise within Montana.
11
In modern times a reason why Montanans have been so reluctant to
solve their problems caused by mining, logging, and ranching is that
those three industries used to be the pillars of the Montana economy,
and that they became bound up with Montana's pioneer spirit and
identity.
12
Diamond points out the crucial role of natural resources in Montanan's values
by describing old timers as
11
Collapse : How societies choose to fail or to survive, by Jared Diamond, Penguin Book
(2006), page 37.
12
Page 432.
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[...] people born in Montana, of families resident in the state for
many generations, respecting a lifestyle and economy traditionally
built on the three pillars of mining, logging, and agriculture [...].
13
These values are linked to right-wing orientations and have their roots in the
deep history of American development :
[...] Montanans tend to be conservative, and suspicious of gov-
ernmental regulation. That attitude arose historically because early
settlers were living at low population density on a frontier far from
government centers, had to be self-sucient, and couldn't look to
government to solve their problems.
14
The work by Jared Diamond oers an rich an interesting case study of the
link between natural resources and individual orientations. The book does not
oer any support for the hypothesis that natural resources abundance induces
selsh and anti-redistributive behaviors, however, it documents the interplay
between natural resources and individualist orientations. The later have thus
an impact both on general economic orientations and on the management of
natural resources.
To sum up, Jared Diamond description of Montana's society illustrates the
interplay between natural resources, values and economic organization.
13
Page 57.
14
Page 63.
32
